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FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF NON-TENURED
TEACHERS
Richard Parish
A teacher employed by the State of Montana receives tenure
when he accepts a contract for the fourth consecutive year within a
particular school district.' Upon termination, any tenured teacher
has the right to obtain a written statement delineating the specific
reasons for his release, the right to a hearing before his local school
board, and the right to appeal to the county superintendent and the
Superintendent of Public Instruction.' A nontenured teacher has
never enjoyed any of these rights. The 1975 legislature, however,
enacted a new statute giving every nontenured teacher the right to
receive a statement of reasons for the non-renewal of his contract.'
About the time this law was being considered, a rather unique case
was being litigated in federal district court. In Morrison v. Cascade
County School District,4 a school board gratuitously gave a nonten-
ured teacher the reasons for her release, but her release for those
reasons was found to be in derogation of her First Amendment
rights.5 The case serves not only as a warning to school boards re-
garding their employment practices, but also as a hint of the future,
since school boards will now be required to present every nontenured
teacher with a statement of the grounds for his or her release.
I. SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE
The plaintiff taught at a combination grade school and high
school in the small Montana town of Centerville. Following her
second year of teaching there, she was notified that her contract
would not be renewed. The following is a summary of the District
School Board's enumerated reasons for her release and the court's
findings concerning them:
1. The board stated that she was the subject of "constant
parental complaints".' It was found that she did not maintain good
relationships with students and parents during her first year, and
1. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947 [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 75-6103.
2. R.C.M. 1947, § 75-6104.
3. R.C.M. 1947, § 75-6105.1(2): When the trustees notify a nontenure teacher of termi-
nation, the teacher may within ten (10) days after receipt of such notice make written request
of the trustees for a statement in writing of the reasons for termination of employment. Within
ten (10) days after receipt of the request the trustees shall furnish such statement to the
teacher. (Effective March 19, 1975).
4. Morrison v. Cascade County School District, 32 St. Rptr. 467 (D. Mont. 1975). Note
that this case will apparently not be reported in the Federal Supplement.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Morrison v. Cascade County School District, supra note 4 at 468.
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in one incident slapped both a student and the student's protesting
parent. Because of this, the board voted not to renew her contract,
but was persuaded by the superintendent to change its vote and
rehire her for a second year. There was some evidence of parental
complaints during the second year, but it was determined that she
generally maintained pleasant relationships with the students and
most of the other teachers.7
2. She was charged with uttering "crude and offensive re-
marks", causing dissension and ill feeling among teachers and ad-
ministrators.8 In this context, the court found that she insulted the
superintendent at a Montana Education Association meeting. In
disgust, she remarked, "The Lord hath spoken", referring to the
superintendent.' The superintendent was also angered by the plain-
tiff's discussions in and out of staff meetings concerning the issues
of a free preparation period and duty-free lunch periods for the
teachers. Both of these proposals were opposed by the superintend-
ent.
3. She was also charged with thwarting efforts to seal an exist-
ing division between the elementary and high school staff, but no
evidence was found to support this contention. 0
In addition to the formal reasons given for their decision, the
court found that the board members were influenced by the plain-
tiff's activities as a member of the district negotiating team. There
was a long and unpleasant series of contract negotiations that year.
However, the crucial factor in the board's decision to release her was
said to be the superintendent's adverse recommendation."
In summary, the court held that the plaintiff was not rehired
because of the unpleasant relationship between her and the superin-
tendent which was caused by her legitimate discussions of issues of
concern to teachers." The court was not prepared, however, to order
reinstatement of the plaintiff. A balancing of the conduct of all the
parties, including the plaintiff's past difficulties with students and
parents, and the fact that a nontenured teacher in Montana had "no
entitlements", led the court to conclude that damages equivalent to
one year's salary plus attorney's fees would be sufficient. 3
7. Id. at 467.
8. Id. at 468.
9. Id. at 469.
10. Id. at 468, n. 1.
11. Id. at 470. There were four teachers involved in the negotiations. Three of them, all
nontenured teachers, were denied renewal of their contracts for the next year. This is certainly
a good argument for the common policy of electing only tenured teachers as negotiators.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 470, 471.
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The theory that public employment may be conditioned upon
the relinquishment of constitutional rights has been unequivocally
and universally rejected." The exercise of First Amendment rights
may not be the basis for the denial of an employment contract to
any teacher." Before a teacher can find relief in the courts, at least
three distinct determinations must be made:
A. Was the teacher's activity protected by the First Amend-
ment?
B. Was that protected activity the cause of the teacher's re-
lease?
C. If the above are answered affirmatively, what remedy is
appropriate? It will become clear that these considerations are
sometimes related but they will be examined separately to facilitate
analysis.
A. First Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court set forth the general test regarding pro-
tected communications by a teacher in Pickering v. Board of
Education.6 In this case a nontenured high school teacher wrote a
letter to the editor of a newspaper accusing the board of wasting the
taxpayers' money and accusing the superintendent of attempting to
conceal that fact. Pickering was released for causing what was
claimed to be irreparable damage to the reputations of the adminis-
trators and to faculty discipline. Pickering protested that the letter
was a valid exercise of his First Amendment rights. The Supreme
Court said:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.
Pickering gave some important indications of how such a bal-
ancing test should be applied. The Court emphasized the absence
in that case of a close working relationship between the teachers and
the board or the superintendent.'" Thus the board could not claim
that "personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper
14. Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-6 (1967). For a discussion of the
demise of this theory in the context of rights of teachers see Van Alstyne, The Constitutional
Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841.
15. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972).
16. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
17. Id. at 568.
18. Id. at 569-70.
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functioning."' 9 As long as this impersonal relationship exists, the
extent of the criticism is irrelevant:
[T]o the extent that the Board's position here can be taken to
suggest that even comments on matters of public concern that are
substantially correct. . .may furnish grounds for dismissal if they
are sufficiently critical in tone, we unequivocally reject it."0
Despite the fact that some of Pickering's statements were
shown to be false, the Court emphasized that there was no showing
of harm to the operation of the school."' In light of the balancing test
enumerated above, it seems that this should be a prime considera-
tion.
Some interesting problems arise when the holding in Pickering
is related to the facts of Morrison. It could at least be argued that
the plaintiffs insult of the superintendent might not fall under First
Amendment protection. A district superintendent in a small rural
school often works very closely with the teachers. Assuming the
existence of this intimate relationship, public insults of the superin-
tendent may create an atmosphere harmful to efficient school oper-
ations. Insults "add very little to the world of ideas"2 and have been
outweighed by the school's interest in discipline in more aggravated
instances.2 3 Further, Mrs. Morrison's remarks appeared to cause
some dissension and ill feeling among teachers and supervisors. 4
This, however, is a tenuous argument and probably would have
been foreclosed by the court's characterization of the unpleasant
relationship between her and the superintendent as "caused by
plaintiff's occasionally abrasive manner and Superintendent
Kinna's overreaction to it".25
The board was standing on even thinner ice regarding the meet-
ings between the plaintiff and other teachers to discuss the duty-
free lunch period and free preparation period. These were clearly
acceptable communications involving matters of public concern and
no evidence of harm to school operations could be shown other than
the superintendent's description of the meetings as "disruptive". 6
In addition, it was not disputed that the union activities of the
plaintiff were protected; the board attempted only to refute the
19. Id. at 570.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 571.
22. Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900, 917 (D. Ariz. 1972), modified, 512 F,2d 109
(9th Cir. 1975).
23. Id. at 917 (insults in the form of profanities); Amburgey v. Cassady, 507 F.2d 728
(6th Cir. 1974) (insulted another teacher in front of students).
24. Morrison v. Cascade County School District, supra note 4 at 468.
25. Id. at 470.
26. Id. at 469.
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charges that such activities had anything to do with her dismissal.'
The court did not purport to undertake any Pickering type of
balancing approach, perhaps because the plaintiff's communica-
tions were so obviously within the realm of First Amendment pro-
tection. Clearly the application of this test supports the court's
findings that constitutionally protected activities were involved.
B. Cause of Release
Once a teacher has shown that his words were constitutionally
protected, he must prove that the protected statements motivated
the board to dismiss him. In some cases, the board only contests the
issue of whether the words were protected."8 In such cases, a finding
of First Amendment protection resolves the issue. Often, however,
there are numerous ostensible reasons for dismissal, many of which
are perfectly legitimate. In these cases, difficult factual problems
may be encountered in the determination of the true motivation of
the school board for releasing the teacher.
There are at least two possible standards for finding that a
dismissal was wrongful. According to one standard, if the decision
not to rehire was even in partial retaliation for the protected activ-
ity, then it was wrongful.29 This affords the maximum protection to
the teacher but it also involves inherent dangers. A notoriously in-
competent teacher should not be able to gain redress in the courts
because his superiors also wanted to be rid of him for some minor
public criticism or other protected activity.
The second, more accepted standard is that relief will be
granted if "the primary or substantial cause of the discipline is an
impermissible restraint on the plaintiffs constitutional rights".'"
This is an attempt to avoid injustice on both ends of the spectrum.
An incompetent teacher is not allowed relief on the basis of some
protected activity that had very little to do with his dismissal; and
where the primary motivation for dismissal is the exercise of pro-
tected rights, a school board may not rely upon some minor incident
that was not protected.
Under this standard the factual determination must be made
of the "primary or substantial" cause of the teacher's release. Ob-
viously, the court can first look to the veracity of the board's consti-
tutionally acceptable charges. If they are found to be untrue the
court may well infer that the teacher was dismissed for activities
under constitutional protection. This process was utilized in
27. Id.
28. Pickering v. Board of Education, supra note 16.
29. Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 660 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
30. Starsky v. Williams, supra note 22 at 916.
1976]
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Morrison. An examination of the charges against the plaintiff was
made, not because a reason was necessary at that time, but because
"it bears upon the states of mind involved".3' Conversely, the board
may defeat this inference by showing that its members were not
aware of the teacher's asserted exercise of free speech.2
If legitimate charges are supported by the evidence, their grav-
ity must be weighed against the significance of the charges referring
to protected conduct. The words "substantial" and "primary" be-
come critical. Clearly, when the only charges that do not involve
constitutionally protected activities are insignificant and arbitrary,
a court should not believe that the board dismissed the teacher for
those reasons.Y The teacher's overall competence in relation to the
gravity of the charges may also be considered. For example, in
Johnson v. Branch,4 an admittedly excellent teacher who was ex-
tensively involved in civil rights activities was terminated for trivial
reasons such as arriving late to supervise an athletic event, and
failing to stand in the hall when the students changed classes.35 She
was ordered reinstated. 36 In Irby v. McGowan,37 by contrast, a
teacher who had severely criticized the way the school was operated
was denied relief after it was shown that she had consistently failed
to do assigned work and missed deadlines.38 The free speech issue
was said to be a "ploy"." A court may consider the cumulative effect
of a number of seemingly trivial offenses, however, and find an
overall picture of incompetence.1°
Selective enforcement is a useful test when the charges and the
protected speech seem relatively equal in weight.4' To apply this
test, the court must determine whether another teacher who engages
in the same unprotected activity as the plaintiff, but who does not
engage in the protected activity, would also be released by the
board. Evidence that other teachers have broken the same rules and
received only a mild reprimand is significant.42 The selective en-
forcement test is particularly helpful because it can be used either
31. Morrison v. Cascade County School District, supra note 4 at 468, n. 1.
32. Shields v. Watrel, 333 F. Supp. 260, 263 (W.D. Penn. 1971).
33. Hanover Township Federation of Teachers v. Hanover Community School, 318 F.
Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972); Chase v. Fall Mountain
Regional School District, 330 F. Supp. 388 (D. N.H. 1971).
34. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
35. Id. at 182.
36. Id.
37. Irby v. McGowan, 380 F. Supp. 1024 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
38. Id. at 1030.
39. Id.
40. See, Starsky v. Williams, supra note 22 at 926.
41. See, Note, Civil Rights-Academic Freedom-Refusal to Rehire a Non-tenure
Teacher for a Constitutionally Impermissable Reason, 1970 Wisc. L. REV. 162, 169.
42. See, Starsky v. Willimas, supra note 22 at 926.
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affirmatively or negatively. Any available evidence of others being
released or retained after performing essentially the same acts for
which the plaintiff was said to have been released may be determi-
native.
In Morrison, there were both protected and unprotected types
of conduct to consider, and there was some problem determining the
board's true motivation. The plaintiff had experienced some diffi-
culties with students and parents, and the slapping incidents were
certainly legitimate bases for her dismissal. 3 Also, at the time of
this case the board needed no reason at all to refuse to renew the
contract of a nontenured teacher." But all of the board's remaining
charges that were found by the court to be true, involved Mrs.
Morrison's First Amendment activities. The court engaged in very
little analysis on this point. Again it was probably the overwhelming
nature of the evidence that prompted the court simply to state:
"...the refusal to renew was inextricably entwined in plaintiff's
exercise of first amendment rights.""
C. The Remedy
The federal Civil Rights Statute allows a person deprived of his
constitutional rights to receive either legal or equitable relief."
Thus, when a nontenured teacher has been dimissed in violation of
the First Amendment, the court must decide whether monetary
damages or injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement, or a com-
bination of the two, is proper.
At least one case has adopted the theory that a nontenured
teacher is not entitled to reinstatement because he lacks an expect-
ancy of reemployment. 7 Admittedly, a nontenured teacher has no
right to another year's contract. The more accepted view looks far-
ther than a mere contractual determination:
What is at stake is the vindication of constitutional rights-the
right not to be punished by the State or to suffer retaliation at its
hand because a public employee persists in the exercise of First
Amendment rights.4"
If the issue is one of vindication of rights, it appears that the most
desirable remedy would entirely negate the board's attempted dep-
43. The argument was not suggested, but perhaps could be made that the board, by
rehiring the plaintiff with knowledge that these incidents occurred, should not be allowed to
use them after the next year. See, Starsky v. Williams, supra note 22 at 911.
44. Cookson v. Lewistown School District #1, 351 F. Supp. 983 (D. Mont. 1972).
45. Morrison v. Cascade County School District, supra note 4 at 470.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
47. Bhargave v. Cloer, 355 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
48. Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 856 (5th Cir. 1969).
19761
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rivation of those rights. This, of course, would point to reinstate-
ment. Indeed, the majority of courts, whether considering the First
Amendment rights of tenured or nontenured teachers, have ordered
reinstatement.49
The Morrison approach of granting monetary damages but re-
fusing to order reinstatement is unusual, though not unprecedented.
This holding was based upon a recent case, Burton v. Cascade
School District, 0 which is highly questionable authority for the facts
in Morrison. In Burton, a homosexual teacher was discharged pur-
suant to an unconstitutionally vague statute." On appeal by the
teacher, the district judge was found to have acted within his discre-
tion in awarding monetary damages in lieu of reinstatement because
of the potential for disruption in the school and the community due
to the widespread and long standing nature of the controversy."
However, that case held reinstatement to be the usual remedy in
cases involving racial discrimination and in cases in which "dis-
missal appears to have been in reprisal for the legal exercise of free
expression in a manner critical of the public employer."53 This is
clearly doubtful authority for the denial of reinstatement in a case
such as Morrison.
There are intimations, even in cases involving denial of First
Amendment rights to teachers, that a selection of a remedy may
depend upon all of the facts. 4 This seems preferable to a mechanical
rule mandating reinstatement in every case. Accordingly, reinstate-
ment may not be proper when a teacher was hired on an emergency
basis and was not certified.55 But it may not be denied on the basis
that it would revive old antagonisms. 6
In Morrison, two bases were emphasized for the denial of rein-
statement. The first was the fact that "plaintiff had done things
which would have provided the Board with a reason, and perhaps a
just cause, had they needed one, for discharging her."" The second
49. Gieringer v. Center School District No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir. 1973);
Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1973); Cooley v. Board of Education of Forrest
City School District, 453 F.2d 282, 287 (8th Cir. 1972); Ramsey v. Hopkins, 447 F.2d 128 (5th
Cir. 1971); Lusk v. Estes, supra note 29 at 664; Starsky v. Williams, supra note 22 at 928;
McGee v. Richmond Unified School District, 30 F. Supp. 1052, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 1969); cf.
Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35, 40 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
50. Burton v. Cascade School District, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'g 353 F. Supp.
254 (D. Oregon 1973).
51. Burton v. Cascade School District, 353 F. Supp. 254, 255 (D. Oregon 1973).
52. Burton v. Cascade School District, supra note 50 at 853.
53. Id.
54. Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, supra note 48 at 859; Sterzing v. Fort Bend
Independent School District, 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. Bates v. Hinds, 334 F. Supp. 528, 533 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
56. Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School District, supra note 54 at 93.
57. Morrison v. Cascade County School District, supra note 4 at 470.
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reason was that the plaintiff would qualify for tenure if she was
awarded a contract the next year, and if the board wanted to release
her then, she could bring another lawsuit charging infringement of
her First Amendment rights." It appears, however, that a logical
extension of that second argument would apply to any nontenured
teacher, because any nontenured teacher who is reinstated could be
released at a later time, and could bring another lawsuit, and at
some future date hope to attain the coveted tenure status. Of course,
here the board had good reasons for releasing the plaintiff, but it is
questionable why a future court could not make the same decision
concerning the cause of release after another year. Obviously, pract-
ical considerations of avoiding future problems and possible litiga-
tion were found to be paramount over "vindication of rights".
In summary, Morrison points out that activities which could
have been the basis for dismissal, even though they were not the
board's motivation, may surface again in the determination of a
remedy. Although reinstatement is the usual and preferable remedy
for a teacher who has been released in violation of the First Amend-
ment, it will not be granted without balancing all the facts and
circumstances, including a teacher's nontenured status as well as
his past conduct as a teacher.
III. CONCLUSION
From Morrison and the 1975 Amendment giving a nontenured
teacher the right to a statement of reasons for his dismissal," certain
inferences may be drawn about the basic teacher-employer relation-
ship in Montana. A school board may not rid itself of a teacher
solely because the teacher speaks out in a manner critical of the
board or other administrators. To dismiss a nontenured teacher who
has expressed such public criticism, a board must be able to show
a legitimate basis for the dismissal to rebut any First Amendment
claims. In the absence of a constitutional claim by the teacher,
Morrison does not say whether the court will examine the adequacy
of the stated reasons for dismissal, because no statute required the
board to give reasons at that time. In any case, First Amendment
considerations have certainly become more important. First, more
cases of violation of First Amendment rights are apt to be exposed,
and secondly, there should be a deterrent effect due to the school
boards' knowledge that they will have to state some reasons for the
non-renewal of any teacher's contract.
This deterrent effect is limited to some extent by the remedy
58. Id. at 471.
59. R.C.M. 1947, § 75-6105.1(2).
1976] 225
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awarded in Morrison, despite the following statement by the district
judge:
A judgment with attorney's fees will serve to notify this and other
school boards of first amendment rights of non-tenured teachers
and of the potential hazards involved in the abridgment of those
rights.0°
The contrary view was offered by another judge in the Ninth Cir-
cuit:
It is questionable whether a monetary award is sufficient to deter
the school board from taking similar unconstitutional action in the
future. . . . If a similar situation arises in the future it might well
conclude that it would be willing to pay a few thousand dollars in
order to be rid of an unwanted teacher.6'
There is no doubt that a warning has been issued to school
boards, and that this warning and the new statute will have an
effect on their employment practices within Montana. Only the
extent of that effect remains to be ascertained.
60. Morrison v. Cascade County School District, supra note 4 at 470.
61. Burton v. Cascade School District, supra note 50 at 856 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
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